# Mini-Project: Generating Rogue Certificate via Finding Hash Collision

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## Rogue Certificate

- Sotoriv et al., "MD5 Considered Harmful Today: Creating a rogue CA certificate"
- Slides available from <u>here</u>

#### SHA-256


- Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)
  - Developed by NIST among with NSA
  - Multiple versions: SHA-0 (1993), SHA-1 (1995), SHA-2 (2001), SHA-3 (2012)
- SHA-2 family of hash functions
  - Consists of 6 hash functions with digests of 224, 256, 384, 512 bits
    - SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256

## SHA-256

- In functional form, SHA-256:  $\{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^{256}$
- Stepwise computation of the hash
  - Arbitrary length input is padded up to multiple of 512-bit block with special padding scheme
  - 2. Some preprocessing is done to the padded-up values
  - 3. For each block (or chunk), apply compression function
  - 4. Add up all results from each block(chunk)

## SHA-256: Compression


Computation done each round looks like follows:



#### SHA-256-18\*

- There is no such thing in reality! We are making up our own hash for this assignment ©
- Two simplifications
  - 0-pad inputs to the multiple of 64 bytes
  - Reduce the number of rounds into 18 rather than 64
- sha256\_template.py file has full specifications for SHA-256-18!

## Boolean Satisfiability Problem (SAT)




Q. Is there an assignment to the variables  $p_1, p_2, ..., p_n$  such that  $\phi$  evaluates to 1?

## Boolean Satisfiability Problem (SAT)

#### Examples

- $\phi_1(a,b,c) = (a \wedge \overline{b}) \vee c$ 
  - → (a,b,c): (T,F,F),(F,T,F),...
- $\phi_2(a,b,c) = (a \lor b) \land \bar{c}$ 
  - → (a,b,c): (T,T,F),(F,T,F),...
- $\phi_3(a,b,c) = a \lor b \lor c$ 
  - $\rightarrow$  (a, b, c): (F, T, F), (F, T, F), ...
- $\phi_4(a,b,c) = \phi_1 \wedge \phi_2 \wedge \phi_3$ 
  - $\rightarrow$  (a, b, c): (T, F, F), (F, T, F), ...

## Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT)



**Q.** Is there an assignment to the variables x,y,z,w s.t.  $\phi$  evaluates to 1?

## Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT)

- Examples
  - $\phi_1(x) = (x > 5) \land (x < 10)$ 
    - $\rightarrow$  x: 6,7,8,9
  - $\phi_2(x, y) = (x > y) \land (y > 7)$ 
    - $\rightarrow$  (x, y): (9,8), (10,9)...
  - $\phi_3(x, y, z) = (z > x) \land (z < 2y)$ 
    - $\rightarrow$  (x, y, z): (4,3,5), (6,5,9), (9,8,10)...
  - $\phi_4(a,b,c) = \phi_1 \wedge \phi_2 \wedge \phi_3$ 
    - $\rightarrow$  (x, y, z): (9,8,10), ...

## **SMT Solvers**

- Given a Boolean SMT form efficiently searches whether a solution exists or not
- Not every SMT problems are solvable efficiently!
  - 3-SAT problem is known to be NP-complete!
- Applications
  - Theorem Prover: Z3, Boogie, Dafny, ...
  - Symbolic Execution: Z3, STP, Boolector, ...

#### Z3 Theorem Prover

- A theorem prover developed by Microsoft Research
  - Available for download and install <u>here</u>
  - Also available through python package managers such as anaconda

- In this project, we will use Z3 with **python** 
  - Other languages are okay to use, but please note that the template codes are in python

## Demo

## Goal of the Mini Project

• Using Z3, generate collision in SHA-256-18

 Using a given valid certificate, generate a valid rogue CA certificate via hash collision

## Certificate Specification\*

- Does not follow X.509 standard, but still has similar information inside
- Fields
  - version, serial
  - sig\_algorithm
  - issuer
  - validity start, validity end
  - subject\_name, subject\_public\_key\_algorithm, subject\_public\_key
  - is\_ca
  - issuer\_unique\_id, subject\_unique\_id
  - signer\_private\_key\_str
- Full specification in certificates\_template.py file

## Requirements

- 1. [8 points] Find a collision for SHA-256-18, that one message is not a zero-padded version of the other message.
  - Find two strings  $s_1$ ,  $s_2$  such that SHA-256-18( $s_1$ ) = SHA-256-18( $s_2$ )
    - s<sub>1</sub> cannot be a zero-padded version of s<sub>2</sub>, and vice versa
  - Use Z3 to find such collision
  - You may need to find proper constraints to input to the Z3 solver
  - Be careful on what operations you may want to use in each step operation

## Requirements

- 2. [2 points] Create a rogue CA certificate using the SHA-256-18 collision.
  - Given things
    - a public-private RSA key pair (class\_public, class\_private)
    - a valid certificate signed by Gihyuk's private key
    - Gihyuk's public key: can be used to verify
  - Certificate should have power to endorse other certificates (should be a CA certificate)
  - Detailed instructions on write-up

#### Final Points

- Mini project will be out around 8pm EST today
- Please submit your code in one file named:

#### [project]\_[andrewid].py

- Please include your text submission inside the code in a comment form!
- If you want to make a separate .pdf for text submission, that's also okay
- No grace days are available to use for the mini project, so start early!
- It is NOT permitted in any case to show or share source code: please work out individually!

# Thanks!